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principal case the old common law rule was applied, it must necessarily
follow that a unanimous verdict will be required. Whether the purpose
of the constitutional provision is to guarantee a jury of twelve and a unan-
imous verdict or to guarantee a jury of some sort but such a jury as chang-
ing social conditions may demand, is not a closed question. However,
with the presumption in favor of the present case, people who want to try a
different kind of jury should not be denied the privilege by something not
in the written constitution but something read into it by the court.
It is one of the dogmas of the political scientist that the constitution
for any government must be flexible within certain bounds. Strict construc-
tion is the exception and not the general rule. This is only too well demon-
strated in the development of the due process and the impairment of the
obligation of contract clauses. If then, the court has been liberal in the
interpretation of these clauses along with several others, for what reason
was it necessary to apply strict construction on the jury clause. It must be
kept in mind that a trial by a jury a common law pending in the state courts
is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship which the states are
forbidden to abridge under the Federal Contitution.12 Though the state
cannot deprive a person of his property without due process of law, this
does not imply that the trial must be by jury. The states have the exclusive
privilege of defining due process within their boundaries.
There is need today for more business methods in the courts, for
speedier rendition of justice, and the elimination of haphazard methods
by which verdicts are reached. But unless the Indiana Supreme Court
can see its way clear to grant these needs, Indiana is doomed to be burdened
with these pre-revolutionary left-overs for some years to come. The pos-
sibility of a constitutional amendment is negligible. L. E. B.
Insurance-Accidental Means Distingidshed from Accidental Result-
Sunstroke.-Plaintiff's husband was insured under two accident policies pro-
viding for indemnity for death resulting directly and independently of all
other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent,
and accidental means. While playing golf, according to his custom in the
afternoon of the summer months, he suffered a sunstroke and died within
two hours. In the action below there was a judgment for the defendant.
The plaintiff secured a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. Plaintiff alleged that her husband was in his usual good health and
was doing as others were then doing, playing golf, at the time he was stricken.
The plaintiff further alleged that at the time of her husband's injury and
unknown to him there was a temporary condition in his body which rendered
him susceptible to sunstroke, and that this temporary and unknown condition
intervened between his intentional act of playing golf, which he intended to
perform safely as others did at the time, and his injury. Held, under an
insurance policy providing indemnity for death caused solely by accidental
means, death resulting from sunstroke suffered while intentionally playing
golf under the existing weather conditions, although it is an accidental death,
is not death by accidental means.'
12Walker v. Sauvinet (1875), 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678; Pearson v. Yewdall
(1877), 95 U. S. 294, 24 L. ed. 436; Edwards v. Elliott (1874), 21 Wall. 532, 22 L. ed.
489.
1 Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1934), 291 U. S. S. C. 491, 78 L. ed.
619 (Tenn.).
RECENT CASE NOTES
There is undoubtedly a sharp conflict in the decisions of the courts of
the United States as to whether death by sunstroke is covered by policies
insuring only against death caused by accidental means.2 This conflict seems
to be of importance only as a focus of the greater conflict as to whether there
is or should be a distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental
result." The principal case affords not only a clear illustration, but also an
authoritative solution of the problem.3 The opinion of the court as delivered
by Stone, J., justifies and defends the distinction between "accidental means"
and "accidental result." The essential and fundamental fact that cause and
effect are inherently and necessarily distinct 4 is recognized by the court.6
That fact is the major premise in the reasoning of the court, and from that
basis it concludes:
1. The terms of the contract, not the view of the average man or the
policyholder, are controlling in determining whether or not there is liability
under "accidental means" clauses. The court says that the fact that the
average man may consider the injury or death as accidental, or that the
result of the exposure was something unforeseen, unexpected, extraordinary,
an unlooked for mishap and so an accident, is not enough to establish lia-
bility under "accidental means" clauses.
2. The distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental result"
is incorporated in the policy and such incorporation (a) places a limitation on
the liability of the insurance company and (b) determines the basis for
assessing premiums. 6 The insured is not protected against any kind of
accidental death; he is protected only against that restricted kind of acci-
dental death which is brought about by accidental means.
By recognizing the clear distinction between "accidental means" and
"accidental result" the court rejects and refutes the idea that such clauses
are ambiguous and misleading and should be construed against the insurer.
To bring the case within the terms of the policy there must be shown some
mistake, some slip, or some accident in an act or event immediately preceding
2 T. S. M., Insurance-Death by Accidental Means-Sunstroke (1934), 19 St. Louis
Law Review 256.
3 Lewis v. Ocean Acc. & G. Corp. (1918), 224 N. Y. 18, 21, 120 N. E. 56; Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Portland Gas & Coke Co. (1916), 229 F. 552 (Ore.); Pope v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. (1928), 29 F. (2d) 185 (Ohio); United States Mut. Acc. Assn. v.
Barry (1889), 131 U. S. 100 (Wis.) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brand (1920), 265 F. 6
(N. Y.); Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Erickson (1930), 42 F. (2d) 997 (Minn.);
Jensma v. Sun Life Assur. Co. (1933), 64 F. (2d) 457 (Idaho) ; Ismay, Imrie & Co. v.
Williamson (1908), A. C. 437 (Eng.); Nickman v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1930), 39
F. (2d) 763 (Ohio); Paist v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1931), 54 F. (2d) 393 (Pa.);
Harloe v. Cal. State Life Ins. Co. (1928), 206 Cal. 141, 273 P. 560; Continental
Casualty Co. v. Pittman (1916), 145 Ga. 641, 89 S. E. 716.
4 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Spitz (1917), 246 F. 817 (Pa.); United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Blum (1921), 270 F. 946 (Wash.); Olinsky v. Railway
Mail Assn. (1920), 182 Cal. 669, 189 P. 835; Horton v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1920), 45
Cal. App. 462, 187 P. 1070; Fulton v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of N. Y. (1917),
19 Ga. App. 127, 91 S. E. 228; Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1919), 24 Ga. App
431, 101 S. E. 134; Caldwell v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1924), 305 Mo. 619, 267 S. W.
907; Tuttle v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1920), 58 Mont. 121, 190 P. 993; Parker
v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co. (1934), 178 La. 977, 152 So. 583; Mehaffey v.
Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. (1934), 205 N. C. 701, 172 S. E. 331; Paist v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co. (1932), 60 F. (2d) 476 (Pa.); Nickman v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1930),
39 F. (2d) 763 (Ohio).
a291 U. S. S. C. 495-497.
0291 U. S. S. C. 496, "* * * the carefully chosen words (of the policy)
defining liability distinguish between the result and the external means which produces
it. The insurance is not against an accidental result. The stipulated payments are to
be made only if the bodily injury, though unforeseen, is effected by means which are
external and accidental."
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the death of the insured, or some element of his physical environment which
was unknown to him but which, had it been known to him, would have
induced him to act otherwise than he did.7 The act of the insured which
immediately preceded his death was his playing golf. This he performed
intentionally and as he intended, even though he did not intend the conse-
quences. The warm temperature and the sunshine were constant and known
by him to be as they were. He knew that the sun would beat down upon
him as it did. However the plaintiff alleged that unknown to the insured
there was a temporary condition in the body of the insured which rendered
him susceptible to sunstroke and which intervened between his intended
acts and his death. There is, in law, a condition of mind of body not amount-
ing to a disease which renders the insured unusually sensitive to normal and
ordinary circumstances. This condition is called an idiosyncracy or a hyper-
susceptibility. When such a condition is involved and is unknown to the
insured it is considered by the weight of authority as "accidental means."
But it seems that such condition is constant, and not temporary, as alleged
in the principal case. Thus there was nothing in the act of the deceased
immediately preceding his death or in the physical environment which could
in any way be construed as an accident. The sole aspect of the whole case
which could be considered as an accident or accidental, that is, unexpected,
unforeseen, extraordinary, or unintentional, is the death of the insured.
Cardozo, J., dissenting, defends and bases his conclusions on the doctrine
that there is and should be no distinction between "accidental means" and
"accidental result." Cases following this theory allow the insured to recover
whenever his misfortune (the "result," in terms of cause and effect) is in any
way unexpected, unintended, or unusual. 9 In upholding this line of decisions
Cardozo declares, "The attempted distinction between accidental means and
accidental results will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog."
He contends :10
1. The insured's reading of the policy (although it is not at all improb-
able that he may never read it), and the view of the average man as to
whether the death is accidental or not is controlling in determining liability
under "accidental means" policies.
2. "Accidental means" clauses are ambiguous and therefore come within
the rule of construction that ambiguities in the policy shall be construed
against the insurer.
3. Cause and effect are inseparable. "The opinion of the court concedes
that death 'from sunstroke, when resulting from voluntary exposure to the
sun's rays,' is 'an accident.' * * * If there was no accident in the means,
7 William Marshall Bullit, Accidental Means (1927), 3 Papers Before The Associa-
tion of Life Insurance Counsel, Supplement 38.
8 Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1930), 254 N. Y. 81, 171 N. E. 914;
Leland v. Order of U. C. Travelers (1919), 224 Mass. 558, 564, 124 N. E. 517; Taylor
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1929), 176 Minn. 171, 222 N. W. 912.
9Lower v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1933), ll N. J. L. 426, 168 A. 593;
Gallagher v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1917), 163 App. Div. 556, 221 N. Y. 664, 117
N. E. 1067; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1926), 11 F. (2d) 486 (Md.) ; Bryant
v. Continental Casualty Co. (1916), 107 Tex. 582, 182 S. W. 673; Pack v. Prudential
Casualty Co. (1916), 170 Ky. 47, 185 S. W. 496.
10 291 U. S. S. C. 499, "* * * the average man is convinced that there is, (such
a thing as an accident) and so certainly is the man who takes out a policy of accident
insurance. It is his reading of the policy that is to be accepted as our guide, with the
help of the established rule that ambiguities and uncertainties are to be resolved against
the company. * * * When a man has died in such a way that his death is spoken
of as an accident, he has died because of an accident, and hence by accidental means."
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there was none in the result, for the two are inseparable. - * * The
process of causation was unbroken from exposure up to death. There was
an accident throughout, or there was no accident at all."'"
This doctrine omits altogether the essential and fundamental fact that
cause and effect are inherently and necessarily distinct. The omission of
this basic principle as the major premise leads to the postulate that the
ambiguity rule is the major premise. This erroneous assumption culminates
in the annihilation of the right of insurance companies to contract, at least
in so far as the right to limit liability by the insurance contract is concerned.
The weight of authority, in Indiana as well as throughout the United
States, recognizes the distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental
result."' 2  The principal case is thus in accord with the general body of
law on the subject. From the question whether or not death from sun-
stroke under ordinary circumstances falls within the category of death by
accidental means arises most of the conflict in the principal case and most
of the apparent conflict in decisions. The conflict is apparent only and not
real, because as a whole the cases relied upon as authority for holding "acci-
dental means" and "accidental result" indistinguishable can be distinguished
from the cases holding otherwise by, (1) certain material differences in the
factual situations,13 (2) misinterpretation of authority,14 (3) failure to fol-
low the weight of authority,15 (4) failure of the policy to exclude accidental
results,16 or (5) a provision in the policy for "sunstroke by accidental
means" which raised valid doubts as to the clearness of such provision in
the mind of the insured, in view of which doubts the court applied the
ambiguity rule instead of the rule distinguishing between means and result.1 7
The Indiana decisions, as indicated above, are consistent with the weight
of authority in the United States in acknowledging the distinction between
"accidental means" and "accidental result." They recognize the fact that in
the chain of causation preceding the injury or death there must be some
factor which is accidental, that is, unforeseen, unexpected, unusual, or unin-
tended. The fact that the injury itself (the result) is so characterized is
insufficient; there must be something in the act or relative to the act imme-
diately preceding the injury that can be so characterized in order to_ con-
stitute "accidental means.' 8 In the only Indiana case in which death by
sunstroke under an accidental means policy was involved 19 the court refused
to apply the distinction although it recognized the fact that there was one.
In that case the policy provided for death from "sunstroke by accidental
means." That fact may have caused the court to apply the ambiguity rule
as suggested in the preceding paragraph. Thus it seems safe to conclude
that the principal case is in harmony with the law in Indiana and is valid
and reasonable authority for future decisions of cases wherein "accidental
means" clauses or "sunstroke by accidental means" are involved. H. P. C.
"1291 U. S. S. C. 501.
12 Husbands v. Indiana Tiavelers' Acc. Assn. (1921), 194 Ind. 586, 133 N. E. 130;
Schmid v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Assn. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 483, 85 N. E. 1032.
13 Richards v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. (1921), 200 P. 1017 (Utah).
'4 Ismay, Imrie & Co. v. Williamson (1908), A. C. 437 (Eng.).
11; Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co. (1916), 107 Tex. 582, 182 S. W. 673.
19Lewis v. Ocean Acc. Corp. (1918), 224 N. Y. 18, 21, 120 N. E. 56.
17 Pack v. Prudential Casualty Co. (1916), 170 Ky. 47, 185 S. W. 496; Elsey v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1918), 187 Ind. 447, 120 N. E. 42.
18 Husbands v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Assn. (1921), 194 Ind. 586, 133 N. E. 130;
Schmid v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Assn. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 483, 85 N. E. 1032. -
19 Elsey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1918), 187 Ind. 447, 120 N. E. 42.
